Introduction
accession to these agreements would signal the state's willingness to be guided by the During the fifty years following the signing documents' principles, and an optimist of the UN Charter, the body of international would expect that the monitoring mechanhuman rights law grew dramatically. The isms of these documents would promote the high level of formal acceptance of these implementation of these rights into national international agreements suggests substantial policy. In fact, the effectiveness of these progress towards universal recognition of instruments has been questioned by some human rights norms. However, the impact scholars who emphasize that the monitoring of the agreements on actual human rights mechanisms are inherently weak and that behavior remains unclear. An optimist the instruments primarily serve promotional would expect that a state's ratification or or socializing hnctions (Donnelly, 1989 (Donnelly, , 1986 Fors~the, 1985 Fors~the, , 1991 Opsahl, 1995 ; * I would like to thank Steve Poe for comments and sug- Ramcharan, 1989; Robertson, 198 1 multiple internal factors contribute to a 96 journal of PEACE R E S E A R C H state's behavior in regard to human rights (for example, see Davenport, 1995 Davenport, , 1996 Dixon & Moon, 1986; Henderson, 1991 Henderson, , 1993 Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1996 Poe et al., , 1997 . It may be these extralegal factors, such as civil war or scarcity of economic resources, which make compliance with the international agreements difficult for some parties.
These caveats raise some vitally important questions for those who are concerned with the promotion and protection of human rights. Is the optimism generated by the evolution of international human rights law unrealistic? Are the efforts to get nations to formally accept these documents misdirected! Would it be better to direct efforts and resources towards changing the internal factors that either weaken the state's willingness to respect human rights or impede the state's ability to protect human rights? This study is a first effort to address these questions. I test empirically, for the first time, the hypothesis that becoming a party to an international human rights agreement makes a difference in a state's actual human rights behavior.
Two types of statistical analysis provide the basis of the test. First, a statistical test of significance is performed on the difference of means in the human rights behavior of 178 states. This comparison is based on whether the states have or have not become parties to the U N International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A test of the difference in the parties' behavior before and after joining is also conducted. Second, a multivariate, pooled cross-sectional timeseries analysis tests the impact of joining the agreement, while controlling for factors known to contribute most to human rights behavior.
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The contemporary history of the development of human rights goes back to the U N Charter. Even though the U N Charter has been described as 'a constitution without a bill of rights and with only a mention of human rights1 (Forsythe, 1989: lo) , the Charter does list among the UN's purposes, 'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion'. Overall, its references to human rights are rather infrequent and vague and most of its provisions dealing with human rights are largely promotional or programmatic in character (Alston, 1995; Forsythe, 199 1; Ramcharan, 1989; Steiner & Alston, 1996) . This lack of specificity led to immediate efforts to rectify the problem. The first result of these efforts was the Universal Declaration of Human hghts, adopted in 1948 by the General Assembly, which covers simultaneously a large range of economic, social and cultural rights as well as traditional civil and political rights. This document served as a springboard for the two principal international human rights treaties that were opened for signature in 1966 and went into force in 1976: the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Civil and Political h g h t s Covenant includes and elaborates upon most of the parallel rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration. While it does not include the right to own property or the right to asylum, it does include additional rights such as the right to self-determination and certain cultural rights for ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities (Weston, 1992) . The covenant establishes a Human h g h t s Committee of eighteen elected experts who Linda Cump Keith U s r r k o N . + r r o~s I N -~E R X + T I O N , + I .
Coxr:i.rc~ 97 study reports of the individual state's efforts to guarantee the rights included in the covenants. The committee also has the power to investigate and make recommendations concerning one state party's allegations about another state party's violation of the treaty; however, this power is contingent upon both states' expressed recognition of the committee's power to do so.' If the states have joined the Optional Protocol, the committee may also make recommendations based on complaints from individuals. The Economic, Social, and Cultural -Rights Covenant includes and elaborates on most of the parallel rights which were enumerated in the Universal Declaration; however, this covenant generally requires only that the states parties take steps toward achieving the rights recognized in the covenant. As with the political rights covenant, this covenant also requires that the states parties make reports of their progress in working towards achieving these rights. As of January 1998, 140 states had ratified, acceded, or succeeded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 92 states had ratified or acceded to the Optional Protocol. In addition, 137 states had ratified, acceded, or succeeded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural fights.' Thus, close to three-quarters of the world's nation-states have legally recognized a comprehensive set of human rights and have pledged to take appropriate action to protect or provide these rights.
While each of these documents is important in the overall progress of inter- Scholars have questioned the value of the reports on several dimensions. First, because the reports are filed by the state's own officials, it is rather unlikely that the reports will be totally objective accounts of the state's behavior (Robertson, 1981; Steiner & Aitson, 1996) . In fact some reports, such as those of the Soviet Bloc states, have made claims to human rights protection that were almost certainly exaggerated, and other reports comprise meaningless extracts of constitutional provisions rather than reports of actual state behavior (Donnelly, 1986 (Donnelly, , 1989 . Second, scholars point to the large number of states that remain delinquent or that, at some point, have been late in filing their reports to the committee (Donnelly, 1986 (Donnelly, , 1989 Opsahl, 1995) . The Human Rights Committee's 1996 report noted that at that time 86 states (two-thirds of the states parties) were in arrears on their reports.3 Some state reports are more than twelve years overdue. According to the 1996 report, 14 states parties were overdue on two or more reports as of July 1996. For example, ' By January 1998, the Office of rhe High Commissioner for Human Rights had posted on its web-page (www.unhchr.org) a list of 94 countries rhur were currently delinquent in submitting a total 137 reporrs. the committee reports list that Syria has three reports overdue (one report twelve years overdue) and that ~H m b i a and Suriname each have three reports overdue (one report each over eleven years overdue), despite over 20 reminders from the committee.* Despite these instances of late reports, the majority of states parties generally have cooperated and have taken their reporting obligations seriously, with many of them producing substantially improved reports over their initial efforts (McGoldrick, 199 1; Opsahl, 1995) .
The impact of the committee's examination of the reports and subsequent comments has also been questioned. Rather than dealing with individual or specific violations, the committee is authorized to address comments to the states parties generally. More importantly, the committee cannot compel states to take action in response to its cornments (Donnelly, 1986; Opsahl, 1995; Robertson, 198 1) . However, the examination process usually extends over several sessions, in which state representatives sometimes must field hundreds of questions -thus proving to be a more substantive process than the reports themselves (Opsahl, 1995) . As Donnelly (1986: 610) has noted, the questioning during these sessions often is penetrating, and 'the state representatives often are fairly responsive; and the questioning, by diplomatic standards at least, is neither excessively deferential nor merely pro forma'. The fact that all states have sent representatives to participate in these sessions demonstrates the seriousness with which the states view the committee and this process (McGoldrick, 199 1: 500) . While McGoldrick has observed that it is very difficult to provide 'positive evidence + Ocher delinquent scares include Kenya and Mali which also have three reports overdue with one report each ar leas ten years overdue. Jamaicz has nvo overdue reports. one at least ten years overdue. Guyana and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has nvo overdue reports, one that is ar least nine years overdue.
that the existence of the Covenant and the work of the H R C is having any concrete and positive effect on human rights positions in the States parties', he noted that 'many of the State representatives that have appeared before the H R C have stated that the Covenant and the work of the H R C have played an important role at the national level' (McGoldrick, 1991 : 504) . Even Donnelly, who remains skeptical of the agreement's impact, concedes that in some instances, the process may have provided parties an occasion for 'genuine review and reexamination of national laws, policies, and practices' or may have led to at least minor changes in national law (Donnelly, 1986: 61 0) . The committee's examination of interstate complaints under Article 41, which in the original drafi of the covenant was intended to be the principal mechanism of implementation, ultimately was reduced to an optional procedure that requires both state parties to declare recognition of the committee's power to consider such complaints (Robertson, 1981) . Even though 45 states had made declarations as of July 1996, the procedure has not yet been used (Human Rights Committee, 1996) . Furthermore, because of the fragile nature of interstate reiationships, it is most likely that procedure will not be used at all (Opsahl, 1995: 420) .
The Optional Protocol to the Covenant represents a significant advance for the international protection of human rights in that states parties 'recognize the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by the State Party on any of the rights set forth in the C~v e n a n t ' .~ The committee is required to inform the state of the com-' The Protocol requires chat individual must have exhausted all dome5c1c remedies and that there is nor simulrsneously >norher invescigsrion of rhe complaint under another inrernarional ~rocedure (O~sahi, 1995; Robertson, 198I ). plaint and the state then is given up to six months to respond to the committee with written clarification or explanations and notification of remedies, if any have been taken. The committee examines the complaint and the state's communications in closed meetings and subsequently forwards its 'views' to the relevant states and individu a l~.Ĩn practice, the committee has made public the text of its final decisions. The individual complaints procedure has been criticized because it lacks a follow-up procedure by which the committee's views are translated into a binding decision. Instead, under the Protocol, the case is effectively closed once the committee's communications are forwarded to the parties. The only pressure on the state party to comply with the committee's views must come from the moral authority of the committee and the publicity generated by the process, and to date, the committee has not been able to generate much public interest or awareness (McGoldrick, 199 1 ; Opsahl, 1995) . Additionally, the effectiveness of the protocol has been questioned because the entire individual complaints process relies on the individual's ability to get information to the committees -which would tend to require the unlikely cooperation of the offending state itself. O f course, from a practical standpoint, the states most likely to abuse human rights are the ones that the least likely to -become become a party to the protocol (Donnelly, 1986: 61 1) .
Thus, in the assessment of the covenant and its protocol, it appears that on the one hand there is a general consensus that the main weakness of these treaties is that they contain only limited implementation power which relies on voluntary compliance. O n the other hand, there also is consensus that the strength of the international agreement Qccording rhe July 1996 fleporr of rhe Human Righrs Committee, 716 communications against a coral 5 I councries had been received ar that time.
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journal PEACE RESEARCH vnhme 3&/ number 1/janudry 1939 lies in its ability to declare international norms of human rights, its a b i l i~ to generate information about state human rights policies and actual behavior, and its ability to direct world attention to abuses. Whether the strengths of the covenant are substantial enough to produce an observable impact on actual human rights behavior remains unknown. The following analysis attempts to assess empirically these conflicting expectations.
Analysis of the Difference in Human Rights Behavior in Party-States and

Non-Party States
If human rights agreements do make a difference, we would expect that the impact of formal acceptance of the International Covenant on Civil and Potiticai Rightswould be found in two comparisons. First, states that are parties to the covenant would be more respectful of human rights than states that have not become parties to the treaty. Second, after becoming a party to the agreement, the behavior of the state would improve over its own former behavior, The formal and highly visible commitment should make the state more willing to improve its performance. In addition, the reporting and recommendations procedures of the instrument could provide additional information that would help the state evaluate and improve its behavior. Even if a state that already respected human rights at a high level became a party to the agreement for symbolic purposes, we still might expect that the heightened visibility and the reporting procedures would help the country continue to monitor and improve its behavior. ' Conversely, several arguments could be -I f a difference in the behavior ofstaces parties and nonparty sraces is observed, the assumptions Lb~urthe direction of causalicy may be problemaric and should be addressed. It is possible rhar the stares rhac already respect made to support the null hypothesis that becom~ng a party to the agreement would not result In a s~gnificant difference in behavior. First, as we have already discussed, it could be argued that the implementation mechanisms of this covenant are too weak to bring about the compliance of unwilling regimes (Donnetly, 1989; Farer, 1987) . Second, we would not expect a difference in behavior should a state formally join the agreement for reasons other than actually intending to change its behavior. For example, a state may join the agreemenr to deflect foreign criticism (Forsythe, 1985) , or the state may be coerced into joining the agreement by more powerful nations (Donneliy, 1983) . Third, internal factors may interfere with the state's intentions to respect human rights. These factors might include variables such as international and civil war or population and economic constraints -factors which have been shown to negatively affect human rights protection (Davis & Ward, 1990; Henderson, 1991 Henderson, , 1993 Mitchell & McCormlck, 1988; Poe & Tare, 1394) . If a sratiscically significant difference is found, which holds up even in a multivariate model, chen &ere are statistical tools m help deal xich the concern over the direction of c3usdity -for example, Granger causalicy tests (Freeman. 1983 ).
Groups of Comparison
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under study (a total of I25 parties). In this analysis, states that either have formally ratified or have made accession to the treaty have been coded as states parties to treaty (1). Those states that have not taken any form of legal action 'toward the treaty have been coded as (0). Additionally, those states that have signed but have never formally ratified the treaty are non-party states because the treaties are not legally binding upon them.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political k g h t s was adopted separately but entered into force on the same day as the full covenant. This agreement is inclided in this analysis because presumably adherence to this document would signal an even stronger commitment to human rights and because adherence to this document would make the state subject to more comprehensive reporting and complaints procedures. As noted earlier, 92 states are currently parties to the Optional Protocol.
Appendix B lists the parties to this treaty during the time period under study (a total of 73 states). The coding for this document follows identically the rules previously described for the main document.
Measures of Human Righa Behavior
For this study, the perfect measure of human rights behavior might include an indicator of each right that is protected in this treaty.
According to a list prepared by Donnelly (1993: 9) , the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights protects a total of 27 rights categories. These rights range from the right to life to the right of protection against debtor prison, from the right to protection against slavery to the right of special protection for children, and from the right of protection against torture to the right to marry and raise a family. It would be extremely difficult to gather data that could adequately measure each of these of rights.
However, political scientists have developed two standards-based indices that are believed to be an acceptable measure for this study: the Freedom House Political and Civil k g h t s indices (McColm, 1990 ) and Stohl et al.'s Personal Integrity measure (Gibney & Stohl, 1988; Gibney et al., 1992; Henderson, 1991 Henderson, , 1993 Poe, 1991 Poe, , 1992 Poe & Sirirangsi, 1993 Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al, 1997; Stohl & Carleton, 1985; Stohl et al., 1984 Stohl et al., , 1986 . Using both of these sets of measures to test my hypothesis will allow for cross-validation.
The Personal Integrity measure gathered by Stohl et al. includes a narrow set of human rights violations: political imprisonment, torture, and killings or disappearances. While this measure does not fully cover the rights promoted under the covenant, this measure focuses on the rights that are considered to be the most 'egregious and severe crimes against humanity', and the ones that represent abuses that 'are the sort that usually can be avoided' (Poe & Tate, 1994: 854) .8 More importantly, this index covers the core !guaranteed rights -those that would have to be fulfilled in order for the provision of the other rights to be meaningful." Stohl et al.'s Personal Integrity data, ' The personal inregriry measures cover the following rights wh~ch are included in [he lnrernarional Covenant on Civil .lnd Political Rights: (i) life, (ii) liberty and security of person. 2nd (iii) protection against arbitrary arrest and detcnrion. 'I Political scienrists hdve used other meusures rhar are judged to be less sppropriare for this an;~lysis rhan rhe measures I have chosen. Several srudies have used rhe Taylor S( Jodice (1983) negarive sancrtons measure (iUhrooni & Allen, 1991; Blasi & Cingranelii, 1994 Davenporr, 1995 Davenporr, , 1996 Davis ti Ward, 1990; Hibbs, 1973; Muller, 1985) . While these dara would offer the advantage of particularly long time-frame (1948-82), the 35-year rime-frame would only encompasses seven years during which the covenanr is in force and would entirely exclude the post Cold War period. Addirionally, rhe dara cover an unrepresenrarive sample of counrries. More imporrantly, these dara are events counts, and as Srohl et al. (1986: 597) note, a count of reported acrions may nor give a valid raring of rhe overall or general human rights abuse since because a measure cannor rake into account unreporred events or the fact char rhe effectiveness of past repression may eliminare the need For future abuse.
Political scientists have developed two other standards- Tlic terrors of (iv) h u e been expanded to rhe whole populncion ... T h e leaders of these iocieries place no liinirs or1 rhe means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals (Gastil, 1980 ,quored it1 Srohl & C.~rlrron.1985 . itical rights (p < 0.001). Parties to the treaty achieve a mean of 4.28 and 4.34 on civil and political freedoms, respectively; whereas, non-party states achieve means of 3.45 and 3.35. Furthermore, as we would expect, the states that are parties to the more stringent Optional Protocol exhibit the best levels of freedom (with a mean of 5.19 on each measure). Additionally, the difference of means based on becoming a party to the protocol is rather large, equal to between a 1.5 to 1.75 level difference (1.74 for civil rights and 1.82 for political rights). In addition to being substantively significant, each of the difference of means is statistically significant at least at the 0.001 level. The analyses of these two measures of freedom clearly indicate support for the hypothesis that parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political RIghts will behave better than non-parties.
However, the results of the difference of means tests for the Personal Integrity Fbghts measures, which are presented in che second half of Table I The states may not derogate from certain The lack of significant results with the articles which protect rights such as the right L i n h Cump Keith U x~. r t nN,ir'roxj INTERSXTIONAI. CONF[.IC-r 1 0 5 to life, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and the prohibition of torture, and slavery, but violations of non-derogable rights have been found in many cases (Fitzpatrick, 1994a,b; Sieghart, 1983) . l 2
It may be that in these 'situations the regime perceives or experiences such a serious domestic or internal threat that it outweighs any previous international legal commitments. Sri Lanka and Peru are potential examples of these circumstances, with both of these states seeing a dramatic rise in domestic terrorist activity (by the Tamil United Liberation Front and Sendero Luminoso, respectively) and a concomitant rise in political repression. A separate analysis was conducted in which the states that derogated from the treaty were moved into the group of non-party states for the years in which they had officially notified the U N of their derogation. When this adjustment is made, the difference between states parties and non-party states personal integrity abuse increases substantially (mean differences of 0.26 and 0.21 on Amnesty International and State Department measures respectively) and become statistically significant at acceptable levels ( p i 0.001). This result points out a substantively important and unfortunate consequence of allowing this accommodation. Even though these derogations " 'l'he derogation cl.~use in the Covenant on Civil .~nd Political Righrs has been used by states for prolonged periods of rime, such :IS the nine year derogation period in which the UK (1376-84) claimed the need to dero-B:I~C their obligations to the covenant due to 'camplugns of organized terrorism related to Northern Irish .Iffairs which have m;lnifesred themselves in acrivities which have included murder, :~rrcmpted murder, maiming, intimidation and violent civil disturbances and in bombing and fire-raising which have resulted in death, injury and widespread destri~crion of property' (the UK derogation notification. quoted in UN,1987: 84) . The derogations clause has also been used for relarively short periods stich as a two-week period in Panama when the state experienced 'outbreaks of violence, clashes between demonstrators and units of defense forces. and inciremrnt to violence by individuals and political groups resulting in personal injury and considerable marerial damage' (Panama's derogation nor~fication, quoted in UN,1987: 68). should legally suspend only a limited set of rights, this analysis shows that the derogations have a significant impact on personal integrity abuse -which includes behavior such as torture, disappearances, and political killings -behavior that is not legally excused by derogation.
As a whole, the results of these analyses offer only moderate support for the hypothesis that states which are parties to human rights treaties respect human rights more than non-party states.I3 The effect is much clearer when looking at the broad range of civil and political rights measured by Freedom House than when looking at the more limited set of personal integrity rights. While these analyses have been limited to comparing parties to the treaty with non-party states, a more direct analysis would compare a state's behavior prior to the joining the treaty with its behavior after becoming a party to the treaty.
Analysis of the State's Behavior Before and After Becoming a Party to the Treaty
The second set of analyses test whether there is an observable difference in a state's behavior after becoming a party to the treaty. A t-test of the difference of means " T o control for the poss~biliry that the analysis might be confounded by the effects OF the end of the Cold War. additional analyses were conducted in which the posr Cold War period was separated from the Cold War period . Ovcrail, the results held across time periods. In a couple of instances the results were more extreme in the posr Cold War period. For example, when .~nalyzing the State Department and Amnesry fnrernarional measures, the resulrs the differences of means were much smaller and even more statistiwlty insignificant. In addition, the ditrerence of means in the analyses in which the derogarors had been regrouped with the nonparry srates produced even larger differences that were more highly starisricaily significant. Again, this is a result char hints at the imponance of internal threats and the zbiliry ro derogate from the treaty.
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volume 36/ number I ljanualy 1999 on each human rights score was conducted to compare each state party's behavior during the two years prior to becoming a party to the treaty with its behavior over four subsequent periods: (i) the first two years after joining the treaty; (ii) the first four years after joining; (iii) the third and fourth year after joining; and (iv) the sixth year after joining. Freedom House and Personal Integrity scores to cover these years were available for 45 states parties. In none of the comparisons did the states parties achieve a statistically significant higher score in the years after joining the treaty than in the years before. The differences in human rights scores are also substantively insignificant as well, with the differences on Personal Integrity scores ranging from 0.01 to 0.09 (on a five-point scale) and the differences on Freedom House scores ranging from 0.02 to 0.31 (on a seven-point scale). Clearly, this second test does not provide support for the hypothesis that human rights behavior improves significantly after becoming a party to the treaty. The lack of difference may be due to possibiliry that a state's change in behavior precedes its formal adherence to the treaty, especially if the state was involved in a long ratification process. However, the optimistic expectation was that the reporting procedures and committee recommendations would enhance even the state's ability to implement these rights. Still, the limitations of the data analysis prevent us from drawing firm conclusions. Both comparisons of means (party and non-party differences and before-and--.
after differences) provide only an initial exploration of the hypothesis that International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights makes a difference in human rights behavior. The next step is to explore the question in a full mulrivariate analysis, which can gauge the effect across both space and time. 
Model of Human Rights Behavior
The small body of literature on human rights abuse suggests several theoretical expectations with respect to the circumstances under which such abuses are most likely to occur. Most of these expectations have been supported consistently by the early empirical analyses in this field. My model includes seven independent variables that have been shown to be statistically significant and at least somewhat substantively important factors in state personal integrity abuse. For each of these variables, I will briefly describe the theoretical expectations and subsequently specify how each concept is operationalized.I4
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~olitical repression (Davenport, 1995; Henderson, 1991; Hibbs, 1973; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1997) ."
Population Size
Henderson (1993) argues that a large-sized population may severely strain national resources and concomitantly leave the population's needs or expectations unfulfilled. The pressure to deal with these problems may tempt the government 'to resort to repression as a coping mechanism' (Henderson, 1993: 8) . Additionally, Henderson argues that we must control for population size since the laws of probability would dictate that as the number of persons in a country grows so does the number of opportunities for repressive actions. Recent empirical evidence has supported Henderson's hypothesis (Davenport, 1995; Henderson, 1993 , Poe & Tate, 1994 Poe et al., 1997) . The natural logarithm of the total national population is used in the model in order to deal with the skewed distribution of the population data.
Economic Development
Expectations concerning economic development follow those of population size. and Henderson (1991) argue that social and pol-'' Henderson found a highly signific.~nr negacivr relacionship berween the abuse of personal ~nrcgrity righrs and a scale of democracy (based on chs ropology of Wesson. 1987 ) char ranged from scable democracies, insecure democracies. partial democracies, limited auchoritarianisms, and absolutisms. Poe & Tare's analysis also found a scrong negarive relarionship berween personal incegricy abuse and two measures of policicai democracy: Freedom House's politico1 rights measure and Vanhanen's (1990) measure of democratization. Hibbs studies a differenc conceptualization of polirical repression -Taylor & Jodice's negative sanctions (Taylor & Jodice, 1983 )-and still che strong negative relarionship with democracy holds, in chis case democracy was operationalized as elice elecroral accountabiliry. Davenport's analyses of rhe relationship berween negative sonccions and Banks' (1992) policical polyarch and pluralism measures have aiso supported rhe previous findings. Addirionally. Davenporr has found that the specific procedural guarancee of a free press also reduced the likelihood of negarive sancrlons.
itical ,tensions related to economic scarcity are likely to increase instability in the poorest countries and thus increase the probability that the regime would use repressive measures to maintain order; whereas, in wealthier countries the population will be satisfied and less likely to present a threat to order that would trigger repressive state action. Empirical evidence consistently has supported these theoretical expectations (Davenport, 1995; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1997) . Economic development is operationalized as the state's per capita G N P (in USD thousands).
Civil War Experience
A growing body of literature has demonstrated that governments faced with internal threats often resort to political repression to restore order. Although the literature on domestic threats has mainly focused on domestic threat or conflict as a dependent variable (Feierabend & Feierabend, 1972; Gurr, 1968 Gurr, , 1970 Gurr & Duvall, 1973; Jenkins et al., 1977; Lichbach & Gurr, 1981; M d d a m , 1982; Perrow, 1977; Tilly, 1978) , recent studies have demonstrated that domestic threat does increase the probability of state repression (Alfatooni & Alen, 1991; Davenport, 1995; Davis &Ward, 1990; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1996 Poe et al., , 1997 . Civil war, which poses the most serious domestic threat, is defined here following Small and Singer's guidelines for identifying instances of civil war: (i) 'the government, as the central authority in a country, must be involved as a direct participant in the war' and (ii) 'there must be effective resistance, that is, either both sides must be "organized for violent conflict"' or 'the weaker side, although initially unprepared [must be] able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains' (Small & Singer, 1982: 215) .
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International War Experience International war is yet another serious threat which may compel regimes to resort to political repression as a tool 'to maintain domestic order during a state of emergency (see Gurr, 1986) . A growing body of empirical evidence has supported this hypothesis (Poe & Tate, 1994; ., 1997; Rasler, 1986) . International war is operationalized following Small and Singer's guidelines whereby an international war is one in which '(1) there was a total of a thousand or more battle deaths suffered by all of the participants in the conflict, [and] (2) the particular country suffered at least a hundred fatalities or had a thousand or more personnel talung part in the hostilities' (Small & Singer, 1982: 50-55) .
British Cultural Influence Mitchell &
McCormick argue that the colonial experiences, which shape the political culture of most states, may impact the state's respect for human rights. In particular, they note that British colonial rule is strongly associated with the development of post-colonial democracies; whereas other colonial experiences, which presumably were more authoritarian, may have left a legacy of greater human rights abuse (Mitchell & McCormick, 1988: 480 (Poe & Tate, 1994: 858) . However, the initial evidence of such a relationship has been weak (Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1997 ). Following McIGnlay & Cohan (1975 , military-controlled regimes are defined as those who come to power 'as a consequence of a successful coup d'Ctat, led by the army, navy, or air force, that remained in power with a military person as the chief executive for at least six months in a given year'. A small number of mixed regimes are also included in this category.'' All other regimes are considered civilian regimes and were coded (0).
Leftist Regime
Originally, political scientists hypothesized that Marxist-Leninist controlled states would be more willing to use repression to curb threats because their political ideology justified the domination of the polity in the pursuit of an ultimate political goal Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1997) . Initial global analysis supported this hypothesis, but only in the case of abuse as reported by the State Department -a result that seemed to suggest a possible bias in State Department reports rather than a true effect (Poe & Tate, 1994) . However, when the global analysis was expanded beyond the initial eight-year period to a period of eighteen years, the evidence clearly contradicted expectations and suggested that leftist regimes were actually less likely to repress personal integrity rights than non-leftist regimes. While this result was not expected, it is not totally counter-intuitive for two reasons. First, in leftist regimes, control of society and personal freedoms may be so complete that the regime is less likely to engage in the more severe abuses of personal integrity rights to maintain order than its non-leftist
These include regimes 'with either a civilian as the chief executive and several military persons in the cabinet or military head of governmenr who nominated a civilian as the head of Qovernment and himself worked behind the scenes' ('Vadani, 1992: 61) .
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uolurne 36 / number 1 /jirnnaly 1979 counterparts would be. Second, as Duvall & Stohl (1983) and Lopez & Stohl (1992) argued, human rights repression may have an "'afterlife", which affects the behavior of people long after the observable use of coercion by state agents has ended' (Lopez & Stohl, 1992: 2 18). Thus, past repression in leftist regimes may actually reduce the need for future repression or the need for more severe forms of repression, such as those measured by personal integrity rights abuse. Here, it is expected that the presence of a leftist regime will derrease the probability of the more severe form of abuse (personal integrity rights abuse), but that it will increase the likelihood of the less severe form of abuse (of civil rights), as measured by the Freedom House index. Leftist regime is operationalized as 'those governed by a socialist party or coalition that does not allow effective electoral competition with nonsocialist opposition' (Poe & Tate, 1994: 858) .
Research Design and Methodology
I employ a pooled cross-sectional time-series design because it provides the advantage of testing the hypothesis simultaneously across time and space, thus controlling for the possibility that the effects in which we are interested may work at different times across different states (see Stimson, 1985) . The advantages of this design are offset by two potentially serious problems that must be with: heteroscedasticir~and autocorrelation, both of which may lead to the problem of unreliable tests of statistic-significance and inferences isee Beck & Katzl 1995 : Ostrom. 1990 : Stimson. 1985 . T o -.
. --, deal with the problem ofheteroscedasticity I used Beck & Katz's panel corrected standard errors (Beck & Kan, 1995; Beck et d , , 19931, a variation of White's (1980) robust standard errors that was developed by Beck & K~~ to deal with heteroscedasticity in pooled cross-sectional data. I also included a lagged dependent variable to correct for aucocorrelation (Beck & Katz, 1995) .l"
Results of the Pooled Cross-Sectional TimeSeries Analysis
The results of the analysis for the personal integrity rights variable are reported in Table   II . The effect of being a party to the international covenant produces coefficients in the opposite direction of the hyporhesis. However, the coefficients are fairly small (ranging from 0.02 to 0.05), and the coefficients are statistically insignificant in all four models.20 The analysis also shows that the addition of this variable does not significantly add to the explanatory power of the model.
The R2 for each model remains unchanged."
Because my initial bivariate analysis had demonstrated a stronger impact from the more stringent document, the Optional Protocol, a parallel model, was used that substituted a dummy variable designating parties to the Optional Protocol in place of the ICCPR variable. Even though the Optional Protocol variable produces coefficients that are properly signed, the coefficients are relatively small (between -0.02 and -0.04) and are nor statistically significant at acceptable confidence levels. Thus, even the impact of the more stringent document disappears when controlling for other factors such as the level of development, political democracy, threats, and so on.
"' See Beck & Katz (1993) and Beck rr 31. (1993) for a more complere description and justificarion of [his ~pproach. The inclusion OF this variable is nor only sraristically justified, but also theorerically jusrified because it has been shown rhar regimes rend ro use pasr decisions as a baseline for presenr decisions (Wildavsky, 1984) .
Each of the conrroi variables are in the expected direc-[ion and are staristically significanr with rwo exceptions: (i) Brirish influence was 0. 1, scarisricalIy significanr at the . "
marginal level of 0.08 and 2) lehisr regime is only sraristicdly significant at 0.18, unacceprable level.
R: is
proportion of variance i n dependent variable that is explained by the model. In models using lagged dependent variables, R' is rather large because pasr behavior tends ro be the strongest predictor of future behavior. A parallel analysis was conducted using which a state derogated from the covenant the Freedom House measure of Civil IZlghts were coded as (0) rather than (I). When the as the dependent variable." The results of variable was recoded in this manner, being a the analysis are presented in Table 111 . The party to the treaty does have a negative effect of being a party to the international impact on human rights abuse (ranging agreement does produce the expected nega-from -0.01 to -0.04), as would be tive coefficients (-0.02), but the variable is expected; however, the results are still statnot statistically significant. Once again, a istically in~i~nificant.'~ a whole, the As parallel analysis was run substituting parties results of these analyses offer little support to the Optional Protocol for the ICCPR for the hypothesis that states which become . -variable, and again the variable was not stat-parties to human rights treaties respect istically significant (with the coefficient '' When rhe revised treaty variable is substituted in the equal to zero). mulrivariare analysis, rhe impacrs oF rhe independent variSince the early bivariate analysis also ables remain unchanged stacistic3lly and subsranrively. In demonstrated the contaminating effect of rhe models using rhe State Department measure the treaty including derogators, another multivariate variable achieves a coefficienr of -0.02 when the Gurr democracy variable is included and a coefficienr of -0.01 analysis was performed in which the ICCPR when che Freedom House democracy nriable is included.
variable was recoded so that those years in in rhe models using the h n e s r y International variable. rhe rrear). variable achieves a coefficient of -0.04 when the '' Only the Freedom House measure of Civil Rights is Gurr democracy variable is included and achieves a coeffirested in A multivariare model because there is no measure cient of -0.02 when the Freedom House democracy variFor rhe most imporranr conrrol variable, polirical democable is included. Only the coefficienr in rhe Amnesty racy, rhar is clearly independent of rhe dependenr variable, lnrernarional model using rhe Gurr democracy variables Freedom House Political Kigha.
achieves even marginal staristical significance (0.10).
1 1 2 j o u r n a l o f P E A C E R E S E A R C H volume 36 / number J /januaty 1999 human rights more than those who have covenant and its optional protocol, the not. impact disappeared altogether. Overall, this study suggests that perhaps Conclusion it may be overly optimistic to expect that being a party to this international covenant The goal of this study has been to provide will produce an observable impact. The the first empirical test of the hypothesis that results are consistent with the assertions that becoming a party to an international human the treaty's implementation mechanisms are rights agreement (specifically, the Inter-too weak and rely too much upon the goodnational Covenant of Civil and Political will of the party state to effect observable Rights and its Optional Protocol) makes a change in actual human rights behavior. difference in states' actual behavior. This States that recognize these weaknesses may hypothesis has been tested across 178 coun-believe that there is little risk to their sovertries and across an eighteen-year period, eignty or to the continuation of their current 1976-93. Additionally, the analysis has policies in becoming a party to the treaty.
included four different measures of human Thus with little to risk, they may gain a rights that are relevant to this specific treaty. significant public relations tool in being a While the first set of bivariate analysis party to the covenant. From a less cynical suggested some difference in the behavior of perspective, states may have genuinely states parties and non-party states, this dif-intended to honor their commitments to the ference did not appear in the bivariate covenant, but may find themselves facing a analysis of the parties' behavior before and serious domestic situation, such as a civil war after becoming parties to the treaty. When or domestic unrest, that interferes with their the analysis progressed to more sophisticated ability to keep their commitment or that multivariate analysis of the impact of the lessens their willingness to keep their com-
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UNI-ED N . \ T I o \~IN.T~..RNATION.AL mitment. T h e development of domestic laws and institutions that help guarantee the promised protection of human rights during such crises may progress slowly and sornetimes unsteadily.
It is too early to entirely dismiss the optimistic expectation that the covenant would make a difference. There are at least two explanations that might explain the failure to discern a n observable impact of the covenant. First, the treaty's impact may be more of an indirect than direct process. Parties to the covenant agree to make changes in domestic law that will facilitate the protection of the appropriate h u m a n rights. Thus, the treaty's impact may be upon the party state's domestic law, which in turns affects human rights behavior. T h e impact of domestic law will be dependent upon how quickly and effectively the party state is able to make the constitutional or legal changes to set u p or modify the political and legal institutions that will be necessary to fully protect the guaranteed rights. For example, a party state that is able to promptly make changes insuring an independent judiciary might be more likely to increase its protection of human rights. Furthermore, a state that adopts strict constitutional restrictions o n states of emergency would perhaps be less likely to renege on its legal human rights commitments. Few studies have actually examined systematically which aspects of constitutional or statutory laws protect human rights best.
Second, becoming a party to the covenant may only be thefinalstep in a long socialization process within the international community that influences a state's willingness to protect human rights. Thus, formally joining the treaty may serve primarily as a formal or symbolic recognition of behavioral norms and international standards that the state has already accepted and has begun to act upon. Evidence of this form of influence would be much more difficult to demonstrate in an empirical manner.
These caveats are important in that they suggest the direction that future research might pursue in order to fully understand the impact of this international covenant. However, they should not diminish the finding that overall human rights protection among the treaty's parties is n o better than that in non-party states, all things being equal. As Opsahl (1995) has suggested, the ultimate test of progress in human rights law must be better enjoyment of human rights and fewer violations. Clearly, we are not there, yet.
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